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5				
6	Attorneys for Petitioners Studio City Residents Association			
7	and Save LA River Open Space			
8	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA			
9	FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES			
10	CTUDIO CITY DECIDENTO	CASE NO - 22STCD04492		
11	STUDIO CITY RESIDENTS) ASSOCIATION and SAVE LA RIVER)	CASE NO.: 23STCP04483		
12	OPEN SPACE,	PETITIONERS' REPLY RE RESPONDENTS' OPPOSITION TO PETITIONERS' JOINT		
13	Petitioners,	REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE IN		
14	v.)	SUPPORT OF JOINT OPENING BRIEF		
15	CITY OF LOS ANGELES	Petition Filed: December 13, 2023		
16	Respondent;	Assigned For All Purposes:		
17	HARVARD-WESTLAKE SCHOOL;	Honorable Maurice A. Leiter		
18	COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; and DOES)	Department 54 Stanley Mosk Courthouse		
19	1-10,			
20	Real Parties in Interest.	Trial Hearing Date: December 10, 2024		
21		Time: 9:30 a.m.		
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I				

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioners Studio City Residents Association and Save Weddington (collectively, "Petitioners") hereby respond to Respondent City of Los Angeles' unwarranted objections ("RJN Obj.") joined by Real Party in Interest Harvard-Westlake School, to Exhibits 1, 2, 3, and 5 of Petitioners' Request for Judicial Notice In Support of Petitioners' Joint Opening Brief ("RJN"). For the reasons stated below, Respondent's and Real Party's (collectively, "Respondents") claims that Exhibits 1, 2, 3, and 5 are improper extra-record evidence, irrelevant, or duplicative are erroneous, and they fail to sufficiently refute the propriety of taking judicial notice of these Exhibits. Thus, Petitioners respectfully request the Court grant judicial notice of Exhibits 1 through 7.

II. ARGUMENT

A. Exhibits 1 and 2 Are Judicially Noticeable and Relevant.

Respondents wrongly contend that Exhibits 1 and 2 are "duplicative" and irrelevant to the matter at hand. Exhibit 1 is the City's Open Space Plan, which is the Open Space Element for the City's General Plan. (RJN, pp. 5-6.) Exhibit 2 is the land use map from the Sherman Oaks-Studio City-Toluca Lake-Cahuenga Pass Community Plan, a component of the Land Use Element for the City's General Plan. (Gov. Code, §65300.5; RJN, p. 7.) As explained in the RJN, the General Plan is a comprehensive, long-term planning document that outlines future development in the City of Los Angeles. (RJN, p. 6.) In fact, a general plan is considered the "constitution for all future developments" within its jurisdiction. (Orange Citizens for Parks & Recreation v. Superior Court (2016) 2 Cal.5th 141, 152.) Petitioners have argued that the Project's environmental impact report ("EIR") fails to analyze the Project's conflicts with the fundamental, mandatory, and clear provisions stated by Exhibits 1 and 2. (OB, pp. 30-33; Reply Brief Section II.F.) Thus, it cannot be disputed that Exhibits 1 and 2, as components of the applicable planning document with which all future development, including the Project, must be consistent (Families Unafraid to Uphold Rural El Dorado County v. El Dorado County Bd. of Sup'rs (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1332, 1336), are relevant to determining this case.

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¹ The RJN mistakenly referred to the South LA Community Plan area instead of the City of Los Angeles. Petitioners regret the error. (RJN, p. 6:12.)

Respondents claim that Exhibits 1 and 2 are - duplicative - and thus not proper for judicial hotice.
(RJN Obj., p. 8.) First, the City has not established that so-called "duplicative" evidence cannot be
judicially noticed. The City makes the perplexing claim that evidence that was before the agency (thus,
not extra-record evidence) is not relevant under Evidence Code section 210 because it was already
considered by the agency in making its determination and has no further evidentiary value, citing
Western States Petroleum Assn. v. Superior Court (1995) 9 Cal.4th 559, 570 ("WSPA"). WSPA does not
support that proposition, and instead finds that extra-record evidence may not be relevant within the
meaning of Evidence Code section 210 because it generally cannot be used to dispute whether a quasi-
legislative decision was supported by substantial evidence, since an agency's factual determinations are
typically evaluated in light of the administrative record. (Id. at 9 Cal.4th 559, 570-573.) WSPA does not
bar judicial notice of Exhibits 1 and 2, which governed the City's determinations regarding land use
consistency (AR 947 [regulatory framework for land use impacts analysis]) and should have been part of
the administrative record, which was prepared by the City. (Pub. Resources Code, §21167.6, subd. (e);
County of Orange v. Superior Court (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1, 7 [Pub. Resources Code §21167.6, subd.
(e) "contemplates that the administrative record will include pretty much everything that ever came near
a proposed development or to the agency's compliance with CEQA in responding to that
development"]; Golden Door Properties, LLC v. Superior Court of San Diego County (2020) 53
Cal.App.5th 733, 762-63 ["Section 21167.6 Is Mandatory and Broadly Inclusive"].) Moreover, to the
extent Petitioners argue that the EIR fails as an informational document, those inquiries are governed by
the de novo standard of review rather than substantial evidence in light of the whole record. (Sierra Club
v. County of Fresno (2018) 6 Cal.5th 502, 512-13, 516.)
Despendents aloin that Exhibit 1 is "dunlicative" because the City's analyses of the Project's

Respondents claim that Exhibit 1 is "duplicative" because the City's analyses of the Project's consistency with the Open Space Element, entitlements, and site plan review are sufficient and demonstrate Exhibit 1 was already considered by the City. (RJN Obj., pp. 8-9, citing AR 5961-63, 23692-93, 23705-06.) As stated above, the fact that the City was required to consider the Open Space Plan during the administrative process demonstrates its <u>relevance</u> to the matter, as it clearly should have been part of the administrative record. Respondents cite several inapposite cases to claim that Exhibit 1 is improperly "duplicative." In *Bravo Vending*, the court found that the contents of a newspaper article

describing a city's adoption of an ordinance during a city council hearing were not subject to judicial notice, and even if they were, the transcript of the hearing itself was already before the court. (*Bravo Vending v. City of Rancho Mirage* (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 383, 406 fn. 12.) In other words, the court declined to take judicial notice of a newspaper article's summary of a hearing, when the primary source (a hearing transcript) was already available. (*Ibid.*) This is completely distinguishable from the present case, where City claims that its self-serving statements and conclusions in the EIR's analysis regarding the Project's consistency with the Open Space Plan suffice instead of the primary source document itself. (RJN Obj., pp. 8-9.) Moreover, components of the General Plan—which guide development at the Project site—are much more relevant and determinative than a newspaper article summary. Further, Petitioners argue in part that the EIR fails to even consider several relevant provisions in the Open Space Plan, clearly demonstrating the EIR's summary is insufficient to address the claim.

In *Onglyza*, the court declined to take judicial notice of a guideline published by the American Heart Association ("AHA") when the requesting party failed to explain why the document was relevant to the issues on appeal and the record contained a statement by the AHA that the guideline repeated. (*Onglyza Product Cases* (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 776, 793 fn. 11.) This differs significantly from the present case, where Petitioners have demonstrated the clear relevance of the Open Space Plan and the General Plan to adjudication of the matter. (OB, pp. 32-33; Reply Brief Section II.F.) Moreover, comparing two statements by the same private entity (the AHA) is not the same as comparing an agency's self-serving consistency analysis with a primary document like the General Plan that establishes legally significant land use policies. Neither *Bravo Vending* nor *Onglyza* demonstrate that the Open Space Plan presented in Exhibit 1 is improper for judicial notice.

Respondents claim that Exhibit 2 is "duplicative" because it is included in the record at AR 9831, and because the City already considered Exhibit 2 before approving the Project. As stated above, the City's consideration of Exhibit 2 only demonstrates its <u>relevance</u>, not its irrelevance. Moreover, given the short, one-page length of Exhibit 2 and the fact it is already included in the record, Respondents fail to demonstrate any prejudice in taking judicial notice of Exhibit 2. Courts typically exclude duplicative or cumulative evidence under Evidence Code section 352 if its "probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability" admission will unduly consume time or create substantial

danger of undue prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading a jury. (*People v. Thomas* (2012) 53 Cal.4th 771, 806–07; *People v. Williams* (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 587, 610–11.) Respondents have not and cannot make this showing, and thus Exhibit 2 is proper for judicial notice.

B. Exhibits 3 and 5 Are Judicially Noticeable and Relevant.

Respondents incorrectly claim that Exhibits 3 and 5 are inadmissible extra-record evidence that cannot be judicially noticed. (RJN Obj. pp. 3-4, citing WSPA, supra, 9 Cal.4th 559, 574-75.) However, even under WSPA, extra-record evidence can be admissible as "background information" or to "ascertain[] whether the agency considered all the relevant factors or fully explicated its course of conduct or grounds of decision." (WSPA, supra, 9 Cal.4th 559, 579.) Moreover, documents that were considered by an agency at the time it approved a project under CEQA are not extra-record evidence but rather must be included in the administrative record. (Golden Door Properties, LLC, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th 733, 762-63, 765-68; County of Orange, supra, 113 Cal.App.4th 1, 7.)

Exhibit 3 is a guidance document issued by the Governor's Office of Planning and Research ("OPR"),² the same agency that issues the guidelines for the implementation of CEQA (Pub. Resources Code, §21083; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, §15000.), regarding AB 52 and Tribal Cultural Resources in CEQA. Exhibit 3 is not factual evidence, but rather legal guidance directed toward lead agencies regarding OPR's interpretation of the correct CEQA procedures for participating in AB 52 consultation and evaluating tribal cultural resources. (See RJN, Exhibit 3, pp. 45, 47 [internal page 3 and page 5 in lower right-hand corner].) Exhibit 3 reflects a technical interpretation of CEQA by the expert agency primarily charged with its implementation and is thus entitled to a degree of deference. (See *Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Bd. of Equalization* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 1, 12-15.) Exhibit 3 is necessary for ascertaining whether the City considered all the relevant factors in evaluating impacts to tribal cultural resources. (*WSPA, supra*, 9 Cal.4th 559, 579.) Exhibit 3 is therefore relevant within the meaning of the California Evidence Code and proper for judicial notice.

Exhibit 5 is Assembly Bill 1423 ("AB 1423"), which aimed to ban use of artificial turf with the presence of PFAS. Respondents concede that the Court may take judicial notice of AB 1423. (RJN Obj.,

² The Governor's Office of Planning and Research was recently renamed the Governor's Office of Land Use and Climate Innovation. (See https://lci.ca.gov, last visited October 25, 2024.)

p. 7). Despite this concession, Respondents claim that Exhibit 5 is inadmissible extra-record evidence
that should have been submitted to the City prior to Project approval. (RJN Obj., p. 4.) However, the
record is clear that the City considered the text of AB 1423 prior to Project approval, and thus AB 1423
is not "extra-record" evidence but rather evidence that should have been included in the administrative
record under CEQA's requirements. (Golden Door Properties, LLC, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th 733, 762-63,
765-68; County of Orange, supra, 113 Cal.App.4th 1, 7.) Dr. Kyla Bennett from Public Employees for
Environmental Responsibility ("PEER") described the provisions of AB 1423 and identified that the bill
was pending in the legislature. (AR 24151.) The City responded to Dr. Bennett's letter and described
recent amendments to the bill, demonstrating that the bill was within the files of the City and considered
by the City at the time it approved the Project. (AR 24039.) While AB 1423 was ultimately vetoed by
the Governor, as Respondents even admit, compliance with AB 1423 is a legal requirement because the
City's approval was conditioned on AB 1423 compliance. (RJN Obj., p. 6; AR 231.) Respondents claim
that Petitioners have failed to demonstrate the relevancy of Exhibit 5, but these facts all show that
Exhibit 5 is relevant to adjudicating Petitioners' claims that the EIR failed to adequately analyze impacts
relating to artificial turf. (Evid. Code, §210.)

Though Respondents concede that the "bill's statutory text and requirements," may be judicially noticed, they object to judicial notice of the bill's legislative findings (Section 1 of the bill text of AB 1423), as well as the Legislative Counsel's Digest that is appended to the document. (RJN Obj., p. 7.) "An assembly bill constitutes cognizable legislative history" under Evidence Code section 451, subdivision (a), of which courts may take judicial notice. (*People ex rel. Schlesinger v. Sachs* (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 800, 813.) Section 1 of AB 1423 is part of the bill's text and thus is judicially noticeable, for the same reasons that Petitioners claim and Respondents concede the rest of AB 1423 is judicially noticeable. (RJN, p. 8; RJN Obj., p. 7.) Respondents claim that Section 1 of AB 1423 cannot be cited for the truth of the matters stated therein if such matters are reasonably in dispute. (RJN Obj., p. 7.) Respondents do not show, however, that legislative findings of AB 1423 are reasonably in dispute, and Petitioners have corroborated these findings with factual data. (See OB, pp. 17-18.) In fact, Respondents' argument is undermined by the fact that the City incorporated compliance with AB 1423 as a condition of approval for the Project. (AR 231.) Thus, Respondents

1	fail to demonstrate that Section 1 of AB 1423 cannot be judicially noticed.				
2	Moreover, the Legislative Counsel's Digest, as published legislative history, is proper for				
3	judicial notice and may be cited even without requesting judicial notice. (Merced Irrigation Dist. v.				
4	Superior Court (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 916, 933; Kaufman & Broad Communities, Inc. v.				
5	Performance Plastering, Inc. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 26, 35.) Thus, Exhibit 5 is relevant and proper				
6	for judicial notice.				
7	III. CONCLUSION				
8	For the reasons set forth herein, and in Petitioners' Request for Judicial Notice in Support of				
9	Petitioners' Joint Opening Brief, Petitioners respectfully request the Court grant judicial notice of				
10	Exhibits 1 through 7.				
11	Dated: October 28, 2024	CARSTENS, BLACK & MINTEER LLP			
12	,	By:			
13		Amy Mintee			
14		Attorneys for Petitioners Studio City Residents Association and Save LA			
15		River Open Space			
16					
17		CHANNEL LAW GROUP, LLP			
18		By: /s/ Jamie T. Hall Jamie T. Hall			
19		Attorneys for Petitioner			
20		Save Weddington			
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1	PROOF OF SERVICE		
2 3	I am employed by Carstens, Black & Minteer LLP in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action. My business address is 2200 Pacific Coast Highway, Ste. 318, Hermosa Beach, CA. On October 28, 2024, I served the within documents:		
4	PETITIONERS' REPLY RE RESPONDENTS' OPPOSITION TO PETITIONERS'		
5	JOINT REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE IN SUPPORT OF JOINT OPENING BRIEF		
6	VIA UNITED STATES MAIL. I am readily familiar with this business' practice for		
7	collection and processing of correspondence for mailing with the United States Postal Service. On the same day that correspondence is placed for collection and mailing, it is deposited in		
8	the ordinary course of business with the United States Postal Service in a sealed envelope with		
9	postage fully prepaid. I enclosed the above-referenced document(s) in a sealed envelope or package addressed to the person(s) at the address(es) as set forth below, and following		
10	ordinary business practices I placed the package for collection and mailing on the date and at the place of business set forth above.		
11	VIA OVERNIGHT DELIVERY. I enclosed the above-referenced document(s) in an		
12	envelope or package designated by an overnight delivery carrier with delivery fees paid or provided for and addressed to the person(s) at the address(es) listed below. I placed the		
13	envelope or package for collection and overnight delivery at an office or a regularly utilized drop box of the overnight delivery carrier.		
14	VIA ONE LEGAL E-SERVICE. By submitting an electronic version of the		
15	document(s) to One Legal, LLC, through the user interface at www.onelegal.com.		
16			
17	VIA EMAIL OR ELECTRONIC SERVICE. Based on a court order or an agreement of the parties to accept service by electronic transmission, I caused the above-referenced		
18	document(s) to be sent to the person(s) at the electronic address(es) listed below.		
19	I declare that I am employed in the office of a member of the bar of this court whose direction the		
20	service was made. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is		
21	true and correct. Executed on October 28, 2024, at Hermosa Beach, California.		
22			
23	/s/ Sarah Bloss		
24	Sarah Bloss		
25			
26			

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