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David W. Slayton,
Executive Officer/Clerk of Court,
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6 Attorneys for Petitioners
7 Studio City Residents Association
8 and Save LA River Open Space

9 **SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA**
10 **FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES**

11 STUDIO CITY RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION)
12 and SAVE LA RIVER OPEN SPACE,)

13 Petitioners,)

14 v.)

15 CITY OF LOS ANGELES)

16 Respondent;)

17 _____)
18 HARVARD-WESTLAKE SCHOOL; COUNTY)
19 OF LOS ANGELES and DOES 1-10)

20 Real Parties in Interest.)
21 _____)
22 _____)

CASE NO.: 23STCP04483

**PETITIONERS' EVIDENTIARY
OBJECTIONS TO DECLARATION OF
JAMES DEMATTE**

Petition Filed: December 13, 2024

Assigned for All Purposes To:
Honorable Maurice A. Leiter
Department 54

Stanley Mosk Courthouse

Trial Hearing

Date: December 10, 2024

Time: 9:30 a.m.

1 **I. INTRODUCTION.**

2 Petitioners, Studio City Residents Association, Save LA River Open Space, and Save
3 Weddington, hereby make the following objections to the Declaration of James DeMatte in Support of
4 Opposition to Petitioners’ Joint Opening (“Declaration”) on the basis that the Declaration and its Exhibit
5 1 constitute irrelevant, extra-record evidence in a case that must be decided based upon an administrative
6 record. Petitioners also object to the Declaration of as an inadmissible and irrelevant assertion of opinion
7 by a nonparty, rather than any properly presented evidentiary facts.

8 **II. The Declaration Contains Irrelevant, Extra-Record Documents.**

9 Attached to the Declaration as Exhibit 1 are photographs of the Project site, allegedly taken in
10 September and October of 2024. Real Parties’ submission attempts to skirt well-established law
11 precluding the consideration of extra-record evidence in a writ case, such as this. (*Western States*
12 *Petroleum Assn. v. Superior Court* (1995) 9 Cal.4th 559, 573 (“*WSPA*”); *RiverWatch v. Olivenhain*
13 *Municipal Water Dist.* (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1186, 1218.) In a California Environmental Quality Act
14 (CEQA) case such as this one, the Court’s review is limited to a review of the administrative record and
15 documents or propositions of which the Court has granted judicial notice. (Pub. Resources Code,
16 §21167.6, subd. (e).) The Petitions challenge the City’s compliance with CEQA at the time it approved
17 the Project in November 2023.

18 Exhibit 1 is neither part of the administrative record, nor appropriate for judicial notice. (See
19 Evid. Code, §§451, 452.) Exhibit 1 was created nearly one year after Project approval and is thus
20 irrelevant to demonstrate that the environmental impact report or the City’s approval process, at the time
21 of approval, complied with CEQA. (*Smith v. Selma Community Hospital* (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1478,
22 1520 [evidence that an element of collateral estoppel was met in January 2008 is not relevant as to
23 whether the doctrine was applied correctly before an administrative governing board in July 2005].)
24 “[E]xtrarecord evidence which comes into existence after an agency’s final CEQA determination on a
25 project may not be considered by the courts.” (*Protect Tustin Ranch v. City of Tustin* (2021) 70
26 Cal.App.5th 951, 963, fn. 4.)

27 Real Parties have made no showing of “reasonable diligence” for Exhibit 1, and even if they had,
28 the evidence must still have “existed before the agency made its decision” to be relevant to the court’s

1 consideration. (*WSPA, supra*, 9 Cal.4th 559, 578.) This post-decisional document showing site conditions
2 11 months after Project approval was not before the City at the time of project approval. Longstanding
3 case law precludes the consideration of such extra-record evidence. (*WSPA, supra*, 9 Cal.4th 559, 573;
4 *Defend the Bay v. City of Irvine* (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1261, 1275, fn. 5 [court declines judicial notice
5 of report demonstrating compliance with mitigation measure that was not part of the administrative
6 record at the time of EIR approval].)

7 **III. The Declaration of James DeMatte is Irrelevant and Inadmissible.**

8 The Declaration states that Real Parties have completed tree removal on the Project site, removing
9 213 of the 215 trees slated for removal and all demolition. (Declaration ¶¶3-4.) As the Petitions challenge
10 the City’s compliance with CEQA at the time of Project approval in November 2023, the completion of
11 tree removal is irrelevant. This statement does not concern the City’s approval process, or the adequacy
12 or content of the EIR or CEQA findings and is irrelevant extra-record evidence.

13 Real Parties appear to include this statement in an attempt to moot Petitioners’ claims about the
14 Project’s potentially significant environmental impacts related to the removal of trees, including the harm
15 to sensitive bird and bat species, the loss of carbon sequestration and urban heat island reduction, and
16 their aesthetic and screening value. However, in *California Oak Foundation v. Regents of University of*
17 *California* (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 227, the court opined that the removal of trees did not moot CEQA
18 claims concerning those trees. Specifically, the court found:

19 Under Guidelines section 15233, when an injunction is not granted after commencement of a
20 CEQA action, the agency may assume the challenged EIR complies with CEQA. However, “[a]n
21 approval granted by a responsible agency in this situation provides only permission to proceed
22 with the project at the applicant's risk prior to a final decision in the lawsuit.” (Guidelines, §
23 15233, subd. (b); see also *Bakersfield Citizens for Local Control v. City of Bakersfield* (2004) 124
24 Cal.App.4th 1184, 1203, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 203.) “Failure to obtain an injunction should not operate
25 as a de facto waiver of the right to pursue a CEQA action.” (*Ibid.*) “As conditions of reapproval
26 [of a project], the [lead agency] may compel additional mitigation measures or require the
27 projects to be modified, reconfigured or reduced. The [agency] can require completed portions of
28 the projects to be modified or removed and it can compel restoration of the project sites to their
original condition.” (*Id.* at p. 1204, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 203.)

(*California Oak Foundation, supra*, 188 Cal.App.4th 227, 280, fn. 31, emphasis added.)

The court continued, stating, “we are confident appellants’ challenge to the EIR with respect to
biological impacts remains a live issue,” citing *Woodward Park Homeowners Assn. v. Garreks*,

1 *Inc.* (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 880, 889–890 in which a different court refused to find moot the issue of
2 whether an EIR was CEQA-compliant after construction had begun because “the project can be modified,
3 torn down, or eliminated to restore the property to its original condition,” and because defendants “chose
4 to continue with the project despite the risk that pending litigation could result in rescission of the City's
5 action approving it.” (*California Oak Foundation, supra*, 188 Cal.App.4th 227, 280 fn. 31.) Moreover,
6 removal of the trees does not limit the court’s ability to halt construction of new buildings, excavation
7 and ground disturbance, or the installation of the Project’s light poles.

8 The Declaration further states that ground-disturbance, soil export, and site grading has
9 commenced and is nearing completion. (Declaration ¶7.) Again, this information post-dates Project
10 approval and is irrelevant to the Court’s consideration of the City’s compliance with CEQA in November
11 2023. Real Parties again appear to be attempting to moot Petitioners’ claims about impacts related to
12 grading – namely, noise and air quality. However, it is clear that excavation and ground disturbance are
13 not yet complete. The court retains authority to enjoin continued construction activities.

14 Next, the Declaration states, “construction crews have followed and implemented the Project’s soil
15 management plan” and all protocols for transporting and disposing of soil, wetting soil, and preventing the
16 spread of airborne dust particles. (Declaration ¶8.) But it is unlikely that the Declarant personally
17 witnessed every movement of soil or every movement of every employee. There is no evidence that no
18 soil left the Project site or that spores did not migrate into the neighborhood. It also fails to address
19 whether complaints regarding the ongoing air quality, noise, traffic and other impacts associated with
20 construction were submitted to the City, County or South Coast Air Quality Management District. The
21 Declaration’s statement is thus a conclusion that contains no evidentiary facts. “All affidavits relied upon
22 as probative must state evidentiary facts; they must show facts and circumstances from which the ultimate
23 fact sought to be proved may be deduced by the court. [Citation.] Affidavits or declarations setting forth
24 only conclusions, opinions or ultimate facts are to be held insufficient.” (*Greshko v. County of Los*
25 *Angeles* (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 822, 834, emphasis added.) This out-of-court statement offered to prove
26 the truth of the matter stated is also inadmissible hearsay. (Evid. Code § 1200.)

27 Real Parties offer up this statement in an effort to moot Petitioners’ claims about the spread of
28 Valley Fever, stating, “There has not been any indication of airborne particles that are related to Valley

1 Fever.” However, the Declarant’s statement lacks an evidentiary basis. Valley Fever spores are invisible
2 to the naked eye. The Declarant does not claim to be a public health expert, nor does he provide evidence
3 for the incubation period for Valley Fever infections and symptoms after soil disturbance. Thus, the
4 Declaration is without evidentiary support to conclude that Valley Fever spread has not occurred.

5 More importantly, these statements are irrelevant to whether the EIR adequately disclosed,
6 analyzed, and mitigated the Project construction’s potential to send Valley Fever spores airborne during
7 hundreds of thousands of cubic meters of grading and soil export at the relevant time – November 2023.

8 In paragraph 9, the Declarant claims that no tribal cultural resources or artifacts of potential tribal
9 cultural significance have been encountered. Again, this post-approval, self-serving statement is
10 irrelevant to the adequacy of the EIR’s disclosure, analysis, and mitigation in November 2023 when the
11 City approved the Project. Further, it is unlikely the Declarant witnessed or has personal knowledge of
12 every soil disturbance or excavation that occurred and is even less likely that the Declarant, alone, would
13 recognize tribal cultural resources or artifacts if encountered or destroyed by construction workers on
14 site. Moreover, the conditions of approval did not require a Native American monitor to oversee the
15 excavation and determine whether there are any tribal cultural resources. (AR 234-35.) Given the court’s
16 ability to order site restoration, issues concerning tribal cultural resources raised in the Petitions are not
17 moot.

18 Mr. DeMatte next opines that the construction team never observed traffic conflicts with Los
19 Angeles Fire Station 78 operations. Again, this post-approval statement is irrelevant to the resolution of
20 Petitioners’ concerns about the impermissibly deferred Construction Management Plan. Even if relevant,
21 which the statement is not, Mr. DeMatte cannot testify as to the personal observations of other members
22 of the construction team. Finally, this statement has no impact whatsoever on Petitioners’ concerns about
23 the Project’s operational impacts on emergency access and response.

24 In paragraphs 11 through 13, Mr. DeMatte states that the School entered into a contract to
25 purchase Musco Lighting. However, this alleged contract is dated April 9, 2024, and post-dates Project
26 approval by five months. It was not before the City at the time of Project approval and is irrelevant and
27 inadmissible. Nor is it attached to the Declaration. Paragraphs 12 and 13 detail features that the lighting
28 system allegedly contains, but no evidentiary support is provided for these features. Thus, none can be


1 assumed by the court. What is relevant is the adequacy of the EIR's disclosure, analysis, and mitigation
2 of the potential impacts of the Project's lights, which will reach 80 feet in height. Real Parties cannot
3 backfill inadequate CEQA analysis with post-decision declarations lacking any evidentiary basis.

4 **IV. CONCLUSION.**

5 As the Declaration and its attached Exhibit 1 post-date the City's approval of the Project, they are
6 irrelevant to the claims raised in the Petitions for Writ of Mandate challenging the compliance of the
7 City's approval process with CEQA. Furthermore, writ cases are limited to the consideration of the
8 administrative record and to documents for which judicial notice is granted. Neither the Declaration nor
9 Exhibit 1 are contained within the administrative record, owing to their creation after Project approval.
10 Moreover, Real Parties did not, and cannot, seek judicial notice for the site photographs or accompanying
11 hearsay or conclusory, out-of-court statements. Petitioners respectfully request that this Court sustain
12 their objection to the Declaration.

13
14 Dated: October 28, 2024

CARSTENS, BLACK & MINTEER LLP

15 By: 

16 Amy Minter
17 Attorneys for Petitioners
18 Studio City Residents Association and Save LA River
19 Open Space

20 CHANNEL LAW GROUP, LLP

21 By: /s/ Jamie T. Hall

22 Jamie T. Hall
23 Attorneys for Petitioner
24 Save Weddington
25
26
27
28

1 **PROOF OF SERVICE**

2 I am employed by Carstens, Black & Minter LLP in the County of Los Angeles, State of California.
3 I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action. My business address is 2200 Pacific Coast
4 Highway, Ste. 318, Hermosa Beach, CA. On October 28, 2024, I served the within documents:

5 **PETITIONERS’ EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS TO
6 DECLARATION OF JAMES DEMATTE**

7 **VIA UNITED STATES MAIL.** I am readily familiar with this business’ practice for
8 collection and processing of correspondence for mailing with the United States Postal Service.
9 On the same day that correspondence is placed for collection and mailing, it is deposited in
10 the ordinary course of business with the United States Postal Service in a sealed envelope with
11 postage fully prepaid. I enclosed the above-referenced document(s) in a sealed envelope or
12 package addressed to the person(s) at the address(es) as set forth below, and following
13 ordinary business practices I placed the package for collection and mailing on the date and at
14 the place of business set forth above.

15 **VIA OVERNIGHT DELIVERY.** I enclosed the above-referenced document(s) in an
16 envelope or package designated by an overnight delivery carrier with delivery fees paid or
17 provided for and addressed to the person(s) at the address(es) listed below. I placed the
18 envelope or package for collection and overnight delivery at an office or a regularly utilized
19 drop box of the overnight delivery carrier.

20 **VIA ONE LEGAL E-SERVICE.** By submitting an electronic version of the
21 document(s) to One Legal, LLC, through the user interface at
22 www.onelegal.com.

23 **VIA EMAIL OR ELECTRONIC SERVICE.** Based on a court order or an agreement of
24 the parties to accept service by electronic transmission, I caused the above-referenced
25 document(s) to be sent to the person(s) at the electronic address(es) listed below.

26 I declare that I am employed in the office of a member of the bar of this court whose direction the
27 service was made. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is
28 true and correct. Executed on October 28, 2024, at Hermosa Beach, California.

29 */s/ Sarah Bloss*

30 Sarah Bloss

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